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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43585 
      ) 
v.      ) TWIN FALLS COUNTY  
      )  NO. CR 2007-2499 
LARRY A. CRAWFORD,   )  
      ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Larry A. Crawford was convicted of felony lewd conduct with a minor under 
sixteen and sentenced to a unified sentence of twenty-five years, with eight years fixed.  
Mr. Crawford later filed, pro se, an Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) (“Rule 35(a)”) motion to 
correct an illegal sentence, but the district court did not address the motion.  
Mr. Crawford subsequently filed, pro se, a second Rule 35(a) motion, which the district 
court denied.  On appeal, Mr. Crawford asserts the district court erred when it denied 
his second Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In Twin Falls County No. CR 2007-2499, Mr. Crawford was convicted of felony 
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and sentenced to a unified sentence of twenty-
five years, with eight years fixed.  (See R., pp.22, 40.)  Mr. Crawford filed an Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35(b) motion for leniency, which the district court denied.  (See R., pp.40-
41.)  On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the district court.  
(See R., pp.40-41.)   
Meanwhile, Mr. Crawford filed, pro se, a Rule 35(a) motion for correction of an 
illegal sentence.  (See R., p.41.)  In the Rule 35(a) motion, Mr. Crawford asserted his 
sentence was illegal because he was coerced into pleading guilty and the district court 
later refused to allow him to withdraw that plea.  (See R., p.41 n.1.)  The Rule 35(a) 
motion was not noticed for a hearing, and the district court did not address it.  (See 
R., p.41 & n.1.)   
Several years later, Mr. Crawford filed, pro se, another Rule 35(a) motion for 
correction of an illegal sentence.  (R., pp.22-24; see R., p.41.)  In the accompanying 
brief in support of the second Rule 35(a) motion, Mr. Crawford asserted his sentence 
was illegal because he felt coerced by his attorney into pleading guilty and the district 
court denied his motion to withdraw the guilty plea even though he had a guaranteed 
due process right to withdraw the plea.  (See R., pp.26-39.)  Mr. Crawford also filed a 
motion for a hearing on the second Rule 35(a) motion and a motion for the appointment 
of counsel.  (R., pp.16-21.) 
The district court then issued an Order Denying Rule 35 Motion Without a 
Hearing.  (R., pp.40-45.)  The district court explained its order denying the second Rule 
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35(a) motion would also act as a denial of the first Rule 35(a) motion.  (R., p.41 n.1.)  
The district court found it had jurisdiction to address the second Rule 35(a) motion, but 
also noted Rule 35(a) relief “is limited to the correction of sentences that are ‘illegal from 
the face of the record.’”  (See R., pp.41-42 (quoting I.C.R. 35(a)).)  The district court 
observed that Rule 35(a) motions are not designed to reexamine the facts underlying 
the case to determine whether a sentence is illegal, sentences illegal from the face of 
the record do not involve significant questions of fact or an evidentiary hearing, and 
allegations attacking the validity of a defendant’s underlying conviction are beyond the 
scope of Rule 35(a).  (R., pp.42-43 (citing State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837 (2013); 
State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86 (2009); Housely v. State, 119 Idaho 885, 889 
(Ct. App. 1991).) 
The district court determined that, “[d]espite the fact that his motion alleges an 
‘illegal sentence,’ Crawford’s claim seeks instead to attack the validity of his underlying 
conviction.  Addressing his claim would necessarily involve significant questions of fact 
surrounding his plea and the court’s decision to deny its withdrawal.”  (R., p.42.)  Thus, 
the district court denied the second Rule 35(a) motion because Rule 35(a) was not the 
appropriate vehicle for Mr. Crawford’s claim.  (R., p.43.)  The district court also denied 
Mr. Crawford’s request for the appointment of counsel, finding the second Rule 35(a) 
motion was frivolous and without merit.  (R., p.43.) 
Mr. Crawford filed, pro se, a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s order 
denying the second Rule 35(a) motion.  (R., pp.57-60.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Crawford’s second Idaho Criminal Rule 
35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence? 
 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Crawford’s Second Idaho Criminal Rule 
35(a) Motion To Correct An Illegal Sentence 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Mr. Crawford asserts the district court erred when it denied his second Rule 35(a) 
motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
Generally, whether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal fashion is a 
question of law, over which an appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Clements, 
148 Idaho 82, 84 (2009).  Under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, a district court “may correct a 
sentence that is illegal from the face of the record at any time.”  I.C.R. 35(a).  The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held “the term ‘illegal sentence’ under Rule 35 is narrowly 
interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not involve 
significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing.”  Clements, 148 Idaho at 
86.  More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court has clarified that “Rule 35’s purpose is to 
allow courts to correct illegal sentences, not to reexamine errors occurring at trial or 
before the imposition of the sentence.”  State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 65 (2015) 
(emphasis in original). 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) governs motions to withdraw a guilty plea.  “The 
decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of the 
district court, and such discretion should be liberally applied.”  State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 
219, 222 (2008).  Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea “is 
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limited to determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as 
distinguished from arbitrary action.”  Id.   
“[W]hen the motion is made before sentencing, a defendant need only show a 
‘just reason’ to withdraw the plea.”  Id. (quoting I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 
799, 801 (1988)).  A motion to withdraw plea will be denied if the State can show 
resulting prejudice from the withdrawal.  Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 61 (2004).  But 
even if granting the motion would not prejudice the State, a motion to withdraw a plea 
may be denied if the defendant has not presented and supported a “plausible reason for 
withdrawal of the plea.”  State v. Akin, 139 Idaho 160, 162 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 A defendant shows a just reason to withdraw a guilty plea if the plea was 
involuntary.  See State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-36 (Ct. App. 2008).  “A 
threshold question is whether the plea of guilty was knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily made.”  State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959 (Ct. App. 1990).  Relief must 
be granted if the plea is legally defective.  Id.  In other words, “[i]f a plea was not taken 
in compliance with constitutional due process standards, which require that a guilty plea 
be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, then . . . ‘just reason’ will be 
established as a matter of law.”  State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333 (Ct. App. 2009).  
“However, a constitutional defect in the plea is not necessary in order to show . . . a ‘just 
reason.’”  Id.  If the appellate court on review determines that the plea was knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made, it then proceeds to determine whether any other “just 
reason” exists for withdrawal of the plea.  Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959. 
 A court determines whether a guilty plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly 
through a three-part inquiry involving:  
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(1) whether the defendant’s plea was voluntary in the sense that he 
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether 
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to 
confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; 
and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of 
pleading guilty.   
 
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484 (1993).  “On appeal, Idaho law requires that 
voluntariness of the guilty plea and waiver must be reasonably inferred from the record 
as a whole.”  Id. 
Mindful of the above authorities on the scope of Rule 35(a) and appellate review 
of motions to withdraw a guilty plea, Mr. Crawford asserts the district court erred when it 
denied his second Rule 35(a) motion.  As Mr. Crawford argued in support of the second 
Rule 35(a) motion, he felt coerced by his attorney to enter a guilty plea and filed a timely 
motion to withdraw the plea.  (See R., p.26.)  The district court denied Mr. Crawford’s 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea.  (See R., p.26.)  But “withdraw[al] of the plea of 
guilty” is a “fundamental guaranteed right of due process,” and “Mr. Crawford invoked 
this right of guaranteed process to enjoy the withdraw[al] of the guilty plea within the 
requirement of the laws.”  (See R., pp.27, 29.)  The district court’s order denying the 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea “depriv[ed] Mr. Crawford of his inherent right of 
process to withdraw the plea of guilty.”  (See R., p.33.)  Thus, the sentence was illegal 
(see R., pp.26, 38), and the district court erred when it denied Mr. Crawford’s second 
Rule 35(a) motion.   
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CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, Mr. Crawford respectfully requests this Court reverse the 
district court’s denial of his second Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence and 
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 15th day of January, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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